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1 Introduction 
Professor Dawid has presented a thought-provoking analysis of causal infer-
ence, and has certainly caused us to think hard about these matters. 
There are three main topics that we would like to comment on: the 
structure of models, the object of inference and the philosophy of inference. 
The desire to make a causal inference leads one to a particular class of mod-
els. From the model (and the data) an inference need be made. The model, 
and an associated parameter of interest, directs the possible type of infer-
ence. We then must decide on a reference set (or population) to which the 
inference will be made. All of these pieces work together in an inferential 
philosophy. There are many choices to be made at each stage of the process 
(model, parameters, inference). Dawid insists that such choices, and infer-
ences, must be based on strict principles that can be verified empirically. 
We believe that such a program is so overly rigid that, in the end, science 
will not be served. 
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2 Inferring from ... 
An individual counterfactual model necessarily involves unobservable quan-
tities. These quantities can lead to unidentifiable models such as (1). When 
faced with such a model, we would normally think that the statistician would 
try to refine the model to make valid individual causal effects inferences pos-
sible, if such inferences are the desire of the experimenter. 
One way of doing this is to shift the target of inference to average causal 
effects. Then model (8), which is free of nonidentifiability baggage, can be 
used. To us, this is a way out of the problems inherent in model (1). Let us 
look at this switch of inferential target a bit more closely. 
To switch, one is forced to place assumptions on the structure of the 
parameters, thus bringing in a "metaphysical component" that Dawid finds 
so distasteful. But, in a sense, this is a reality of inference. When faced 
with an unwieldy model, we have to make assumptions to obtain usable 
inferences. 
One assumption that results in average causal effects becoming the infer-
ential target is that of treatment unit additivity (TUA}, which Dawid does 
not like. But, there is another road to average causal effect, based on the 
thinking of the 18th century philosopher David Hume (1748): 
It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connection among 
events arises from a number of similar instances which occur, 
of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea 
ever be suggested by any one of these instances surveyed in all 
possible lights and positions. 
Following Hume, the causal inference is necessarily shifted from the indi-
vidual to the group. This eliminates any counterfactual problems because, 
at the group level, the counterfactual is observable (one group did not get 
aspirin). 
Dawid's insistence on empirical verification would reject the above line of 
reasoning. Such an insistence not only severely restricts the range of possible 
models, but it also may disregard the scientific input of the subject matter 
expert (who may insist that TUA is entirely plausible for the experiment at 
hand). 
A crucial point is that, if we can reduce the inferential target to one 
based only on marginal distributions, then we can provide a reasonable 
inference (to us, this means that we are working with an identifiable model). 
As Dawid rejects TUA (and presumably the argument based on Hume) as 
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metaphysical, he applies Bayesian decision theory to reduce the inference 
to a marginal one. However, in doing so, he has substantially changed the 
inferential target. The primary target of inference is yt ( u) - Yc ( u), the 
individual difference, which is unobservable. Using either TUA or Hume, 
this target becomes Ot - Ou, the average causal effect. Dawid's decision 
theory argument leads to the inferential target being uo!Treatment = t, the 
distribution of the response given that the treatment was t. While this 
may be a reasonable target of inference, it may not be the one that the 
experimenter cares about. 
3 Inferring to ... 
Whatever the chosen target of inference, an inference must be drawn. Some 
of us think in terms of populations or reference sets, often described by 
the experimenter. For example, in Dawid's Example 6, we can specify a 
number of reference sets. We have usually left the choice of such to the 
experimenter, whose greater subject matter knowledge can be used to choose 
the appropriate frame of inference. 
3.1 Empirical Verification 
Relying strictly on empirical verification, Dawid deals with the shortcomings 
of a model like (1) by invoking a principle known as Jeffreys Law to decree 
what types of inferences are allowed from nonidentifiable models. 
Jeffreys Law is the Likelihood Principle in another guise. The Likelihood 
Principle states that if x and y are two sample points such that the likelihood 
L(Oix) is proportional to L(Oiy) for all 0, then the conclusions drawn from 
x and y should be identical. 
Since the landmark paper of Birnbaum (1962), the likelihood principle 
has been the focus of much debate. It is probably fair to say that with 
the exception of the strictest Bayesian, most statistical practice violates the 
Likelihood Principle. Why this is so is perhaps best explained by Berger 
and Wolpert (1984) 
We emphatically believe that the LP (Likelihood Principle) is al-
ways valid, in the sense that the experimental evidence concern-
ing 0 is contained in f x ( 0) (the likelihood function). Because of 
limited time and resources, however, interpreting or making use 
of this evidence may involve use of measures violating the LP. 
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This sentiment may be closest to what most statisticians feel. There are 
compelling arguments for embracing the likelihood principle but, in reality, 
we need to go beyond it. We must use, among other things, metaphysical 
assumptions, to thoroughly evaluate an inference. 
To adhere to empirical verification and the limitations imposed on in-
ferences by Jeffreys Law leads inexorably to a Popperian view, as Dawid 
explains: 
My approach is grounded in a Popperian philosophy, in which 
meaningfulness of a purportedly scientific theory, proposition, 
quantity or concept is related to the implications it has for what 
is or could be observed, and, in particular, to the extent to which 
it is possible to conceive of data that would be affected by the 
truth of the proposition, or the value of the quantity. When this 
is the case, assertions are empirically refutable, and considered 
'scientific'. When not so, they may be branded 'metaphysical'. 
However, this view is based on a philosophical orientation that is out-
moded and has been rejected by virtually all mainstream philosophers of 
science. 
3.2 Popper is Out 
The "Popperian" philosophy that grounds Dawid's approach was part of 
the much larger Logical Positivist philosophical movement that had great 
currency up to perhaps 40 years ago. Its main tenet is that meaningful 
propositions must be either analytic (mathematical) or empirically falsifi-
able or verifiable by possible sensory observations. Karl Popper emphasized 
falsifiability and, for example, famously directed an attack against Marxism, 
arguing that it was unscientific and just a matter of faith. To that extent 
positivism served a useful purpose. It helped to rid the intellectual arena 
of much philosophical and pseudo-scientific dross. It was like a breath of 
fresh air. Logical positivism has also been influential in science. For exam-
ple, behaviorism is based on the idea that we can observe behavior but we 
cannot directly observe other people's minds. Therefore behavior, but not 
the mind, is a fit subject of scientific study. 
Starting in about 1950 logical positivism was subjected to a withering 
series of criticisms and has now entirely lost favor among philosophers. The 
attack was based primarily on the logical work of W.V. Quine (1961) and 
the historical work of Thomas Kuhn (1970), with much help from many 
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other thinkers and researchers. The criticisms demonstrated that the logical 
positivist program was too rigid and technically unworkable and that logical 
positivism did not represent the actual practice of scientists. If held to the 
rigid standard of Popperian philosophy little or no actual science would 
get done. The demise of logical positivism has had the beneficial effect of 
expanding the horizons of scientific pioneers. For example, cognitive science 
has now replaced behaviorism as the leading orientation in psychology. 
3.3 Counterfactuals are In 
Among the many technical problems facing logical positivists was what to do 
about counterfactual. Certainly many counterfactuals are unverifiable and 
do not seem to be scientifically meaningful. For example, "If I had been born 
in China, I would now be able to speak Chinese." On the other hand many 
other counterfactuals seem clearly to be meaningful and indeed true. For 
example, "If Nixon had not resigned, he would have been impeached." The 
fact is that counterfactuals are indispensable in many areas but attempts to 
analyze them in terms of direct observation foundered. The problem of how 
to understand them is still a matter of philosophical controversy. Probably 
the most widely accepted view today is that of David Lewis cited by Dawid. 
Lewis analyzes counterfactuals in terms of other possible worlds-ways that 
things could have been but aren't. Anathema to the logical positivists and 
Dawid. 
3.4 A Fatal Flaw? 
Dawid's use of tendentious vocabulary clouds his argument and obscures the 
motivation for his views. For example, besides the questionable empirical 
versus metaphysical distinction, Dawid rejects a view he terms "fatalism." 
Many counterfactual analyses are based, explicitly or implicitly, 
on an attitude that I term fatalism. This conceives of the various 
potential responses Yi(u), when treatment i is applied to unit 
u, as pre-determined attributes of unit u, waiting only to be 
uncovered by suitable experimentation. (It is implicit that the 
unit u, and its properties and propensities, exist in dependently 
of, and are unaffected by, any treatment that may be applied.) 
If by this Dawid means that the world and its objects exist independently 
of our attempts to know them, then this view is quite respectable and usually 
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goes under the rubric "realism." And it seems that even Dawid sometimes 
embraces a "fatalist" view, as he says, "Nature is surely utterly indifferent 
to our attempts to ensnare her in our theories." "Fatalism" seems to be 
a highly misleading name for a rather commonplace and obvious idea. If 
Dawid means something else by his use of "fatalism," then we fear he is 
attacking a "straw man" view that no one holds. 
4 And Finally .. 
Clearly there is something right about the positivist approach in general. 
Certainly we want our scientific theories to be verifiable or falsifiable in 
some sense, but it turns out that verifiability and falsifiability are much more 
flexible, elastic, and looser notions than the logical positivists supposed. The 
upshot is that we need to take a more tolerant approach to verification and 
falsification and abandon the kind of tendentious and rigid distinctions that 
the logical positivists, and following them Dawid, use. Scientific theories are 
not verified or falsified by direct observation or crucial experiment, except 
in very rare instances. Theories are accepted or rejected by scientists on 
the basis of how well they explain selected sets of data, how elegant, simple, 
and useful they are, how well they do against competing theories, etc. In 
fact, in his discussion of Barndorff-Nielsen's paper, Dawid (1976) expressed 
a similar sentiment when he said (our italics) 
A constant theme in the development of statistics has been the 
search for justification for what statisticians do. To read the 
textbooks, one might easily get the distorted idea that "Student" 
proposed his t-test because it was the Uniformly Most Powerful 
Test of a Normal mean, but it would be more accurate to say 
that the concept of UMPU gains much of its appeal because it 
produces the t-test, and everyone knows the t-test is a good thing. 
Everyone knows that the simple, 'elegant, and useful t-test is a good thing 
because it has performed admirably for almost 100 years. In the interest of 
science, performance counts for more than rigidly adhering to philosophical 
principles. 
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